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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 





vs. WILLIAM DEAN LAVENDER, 
SHANA L. AMADOR and JOANN L. 
SYLVESTER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 13662 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Bernice Lewis appeals from summary judgment 
in an action to adjudicate adverse claims to the 
ownership and right to receive the proceeds of 
life insurance policy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case came before the Court, Hon. G. Hal 
Taylor, Judge, presiding, on cross-motions for 
summary judgment, based upon the pleadings and 
exhibits on file in the cause. The matter was 
argued and written memoranda of points and 
authority were submitted by counsel. From an 
adverse judgment rendered on March 11, 1974, the 
appellant herein filed motion for rehearing, and 
submitted supporting affidavits and exhibits. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, m y contain errors.
This appeal is brought from a final summary 
judgment of the Court rendered on April 8, 1974, 
wherein ownership of the insurance proceeds 
previously paid into the Court by 
Plaintiff-Respondent was awarded to 
Defendant-Respondents Lavender, Amador, and 
Sylvester; and wherein appellant's claim was 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Lewis seeks reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court and judgment in her 
favor as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, 
that the case be reversed and remanded to the 
Third District Court for further proceedings, and 
for a trial on the merits of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This litigation was started by the Plaintiff 
Respondent pursuant to Rule 22 URCP, wherein it 
was alleged that conflicting claims existed with 
the rights to ownership of the sum of $13,000 of 
life insurance proceeds on the life of one 
William E. Lavender, who died as a result of 
~2-
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accidental drowning on June 9, 1973. (R. 81) 
Lavender was an "insured employee11 covered 
by a policy issued by Travelers to Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, wherein the insured was 
issued a certificate evidencing his coverage and 
wherein the right to designate a beneficiary was 
reserved. As of the date of death, the last 
designation on file with the company named as 
beneficiary "Bernice Lavender, Wife, if living, 
otherwise to William Dean Lavender, son.11 The 
designation was dated January 9, 1963, at which 
time appellant herein was the lawful wife of the 
insured. (R. 82) (R. 51) 
Upon the discovery of the certificate 
evidencing the designation of beneficiary, the 
three adult children of the deceased by a prior 
marriage gave notice to Travelers that they were 
also claiming the proceeds pursuant to one of the 
terms of the decree of divorce entered in 1960 
between their parents. The paragraph allegedly 
purported to "permanently restrain and enjoin" 
their father from changing the beneficiary except 
as therein provided. They alleged that flf the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
decree had been obeyed, they would have been the 
named beneficiaries." (R. 82) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent obtained an order 
suant to Rule 22, U.R.C.P., and paid the money 
into the Court, 
The paragraph of the decree relied upon by 
defendant-respondents reads as follows: 
"6. The defendant is hereby ordered to 
maintain in full force and effect the $5,000 
life insurance policy on the life of the 
defendant with the plaintiff as beneficiary 
and the three minor children of the parties 
as contingent beneficiaries in the event 
plaintiff remarries or dies.11 (R. 45-46) 
The remaining undisputed facts concerning 
the respective dates of certain occurrances are 
hereby incorporated by reference, inasmuch as the 
entire record is before this Court. (R. 43-44) 
(R. 81-83) (R. 70-73) 
On the date of Lavender fs death, the 
children born of his first marriage had attained 
their majority; his first wife had remarried on 
January 27, 1963, and his second wife, the 
appellant herein, was divorced from him in 1965 
and had remarried. 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE NAMED AND DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY 
OF THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED TO 
DECEASED, WILLIAM E. LAVENDER, ACQUIRED VESTED 
INTEREST IN PROCEEDS UPON DEATH OF INSURED BY 
REASON OF CONTRACT BETWEEN INSURED AND 
INSURANCE CARRIER, AND RIGHTS UNDER SAID 
CONTRACT MAY NOT BE DIVESTED IN ABSENCE OF 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF EQUITABLE 
BASIS TO SET CONTRACT ASIDE. 
This appeal involves the determination of the 
rights between the designated beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy on the life of a deceased employee 
covered by a private pension and retirement plan and 
heirs and legatees of the insured. 
In Utah, the rights and obligations of the 
insured employee under a group life insurance plan 
are specifically regulated by statute. Utah Code 
Ann, s 31-20-10 (1953) (as amended), Utah Code Ann. 
s 31-23-18 (1953) (as amended) requires that the 
insured receive a certificate evidencing his 
insurance, and further provides that the rights and 
benefits of the holder thereof are assignable—and 
does not limit the right to designate beneficiaries. 
The deceased, William E. Lavender, at all times 
material to this proceeding, was possessed of the 
-5-
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"incidents of ownership11 of the subject 
insurance, even though he enjoyed only the right 
to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the 
proceeds. See Estate of Lumpkin, 474 F2d 1092 
(CA 5th, 1974), wherein it was held that upon the 
death of the insured employee, the proceeds were 
to be included in his gross estate. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the 
record of this case from which it may reasonably 
be inferred that the deceased was ever divested 
of any of the "incidents of ownership" in the 
rights to designate the beneficiary of his group 
life insurance. 
The law is well settled that a third person 
for whose benefit a contract is made, has by 
virtue of the contract a right which he may 
enforce against the promisor by suit---and the 
life insurance contract is perhaps the best 
illustration. Buehler vs. Buehler 323 SW2d 67, 
72 ALR 2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.) (1959), 
-6-
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involved dispute between designated beneficiary 
and son of deceased claiming proceeds under 
descent and distribution statutes, and in a 
well-considered opinion the Court held in favor 
of the named beneficiary. See also cases 
collected in annotation at 72 A.L.R. 2d 924. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has often had 
occasion to decide between competing claims to 
the ownership rights in joint savings accounts as 
between the surviving joint tenant and other 
heirs of the deceased. See McCullough vs. 
Wasserback, 30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P. 2d 691, 
(1974) and cases cited therein. The opinion 
points out that a contract exists between the 
joint tenants and the bank, so that in the event 
of the death of one, the survivor becomes the 
sole owner of the funds. However, such a 
contract may be attacked by a showing that..."in 
equity and good conscience it should not be 
enforced". 
The standard of proof required to be met is 
stated: 
-7-
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"But as in the case with any written 
document which has been duly executed, it is 
entitled to the presumptions of validity, 
and its effect can be overcome only by clear 
and convincing evidence." 
The same standard applies to one who asserts 
the invalidity of a deed. Controlled Receivables 
Inc. vs. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P. 2d 807, 
(1966) 
Appellant respectfully submits that the 
contract of insurance entered into between the 
deceased, William E. Lavender and the Travelers 
Insurance Company must be judged in accordance 
with the standards set forth above, and should be 
enforced according to its terms, whereby 
Travelers agreed to pay the proceeds to the 
designated beneficiary named by the insured, 
taking effect as of the date of death. The law 
of Utah clearly requires that a contract be 
enforced, especially where it expresses the true 
intention of the parties to the contract. 
It has long been the well-settled law in 
this jurisdiction that no rights to the proceeds 
of life insurance vest in a beneficiary until the 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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death of the insured. Decker vs. New York Life 
Ins. Co 76 P. 2d 568 (1938) 94 Utah 166; Couch on 
Insurance Sec 27:61; 29 Am. J. 952, Sec. 1276. 
Where the right to change beneficiary designation 
is reserved to the insured under the terms of the 
policy the named beneficiary obtains merely an 
inchoate right, subject to the will of the 
insured during his lifetime. Wentworth vs. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. et al 65 Utah 581, 238 
P. 648 (1925). 
The above cases were cited with approval by 
this Court in the case of Estate of Clark, 
deceased, State Tax Commission vs. Clark, 10 
Utah 2d 427, (i960), wherein it was further 
pointed out that Utah law does not contain a 
statute, as do other jurisdictions, creating an 
immediate vested interest in any named 
beneficiary. 
Therefore, only the person properly 
designated as beneficiary as of the date of death 
acquired a vested and enforcable interest in the 
proceeds of the subject life insurance; and 
-9-
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appellant Bernice Lewis being the person so 
designated is entitled to the proceeds as a 
matter of law. 
POINT II: THE PROVISION OF DECREE OF 
DIVORCE REQUIRING DEFENDANT HUSBAND "TO 
MAINTAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT LIFE 
INSURANCE CARRIED THROUGH HIS EMPLOYMENT ... 
WITH MINOR CHILDREN AS CONTINGENT 
BENEFICIARIES ... IN THE EVENT PLAINTIFF 
REMARRIES OR DIES" IS VOID AND OTHERWISE 
UNENFORCABLE BY ADULT CHILDREN AS AGAINST 
THE DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY OF DECEASED 
FATHERS GROUP LIFE INSURANCE. 
The sole basis of law claimed by the 
children of William E. Lavender is that their 
father was "permanently restrained" from changing 
the named beneficiary of his employment related 
life insurance by the decree of divorce entered 
in the year 1960 between their parents, and any 
rights to the proceeds derives from the terms of 
that decree. 
Appellant submits that respondents position 
is insufficient in law or in fact to support the 
conclusion urged upon the Court, and further 
submits that the facts within the record herein 
-10-
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do not present a basis for cause of action 
against either appellant Lewis or against 
Travelers Insurance Company. The four cases 
cited in support of summary judgment in the Court 
below are distinguishable on their facts with 
only a casual reading thereof, and are no 
authority as to the law in this jurisdiction. 
The recent case decided by this Court, 
Stanton vs. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P. 2d 
1010, (1974), in addition to upholding the 
statutory distinction between males and females 
regarding the age of attaining majority pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. 15-2-1 (1953) clearly stated 
that the "statutes dealing with the support of 
children meant during the period of minority.11 It 
is well established that the Court in a divorce 
action has broad and general powers of equity 
jurisdiction over the property of the spouses to 
provide for the support of minor children in 
addition to the specific grant of authority to do 
-11-
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so by way of statute, Utah Code Ann. 3CK3-5 
(1953). But any enforcable rights against the 
father do not extend beyond the age of majority, 
as the duty of parental support is automatically 
terminated thereby. See Stanton, supra, and 
cases cited therein. 
Appellant submits that the provision of the 
1960 decree relied upon by respondents herein is 
a void judgment insofar as it purports to vest 
the personal property of their father in the 
children, for the reason that such a judgment is 
in excess of the jurisdiction of the Court. In 
the instant case the Court never acquired 
jurisdiction over the subject insurance policy, 
and the Court, of course, had no jurisdiction 
over either Travelers or Mrs. Lewis. 
The question of the jurisdiction of a court 
in a divorce action has been challenged in other 
jurisdictions insofar as the authority to require 
insurance beyond the age of majority. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas in Allison vs. Allison, 
188 Kan. 593, 363 P. 2d 795 (1961), in 
-12-
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construing a statute of that state almost 
identical to Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5 (1953) 
stated: 
The statute authorizing the court upon 
granting a divorce to provide for the 
guardianship, custody, support and education 
of the minor children of the marriage, 
contemplates making provision for the 
children only during their minority, and 
grants no power to transfer any of the 
property of either parent to the children 
for the purpose of creating an estate for 
their permanent benefit (emphasis by the 
Court) A part of a decree attempting to do 
this is wholly void and open to collateral 
attack. 
The Court also notes, however, that the 
parties may agree to actions of such character by 
express desire and contract. But such is not the 
case presently before the Court. 
Several similar cases have come up in 
surrounding jurisdictions, usually in situations 
involving the enforcement and construction of the 
meaning of a decree rendered in a sister state. 
The opinion of the California Court of Appeal, 
Fifth District in the case of Bierl vs. McMahon 
75 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969) held that a Nebraska 
-13-
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divorce decree ordering father to make payments 
into fund, not for present needs of the child, 
but to accumulate in event child might later need 
support was in excess of Nebraska court's 
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The above 
cited case contains a careful and well considered 
opinion of circumstances wherein a decree is 
subject to collateral attack or estoppel. 
The opinion cites with approval the case of 
Farley vs. Farley, 227 Cal App. 2d 1, 38 Cal. 
Rptr. 357 (1964), as cited at 3 ALR 3d page 
1176 
"holding that while the Utah statute 
authorized the creation of a trust to secure 
the support of the children during their 
minority, the trust could not validly 
provide for the transfer of the trust 
property when they reached maturity." 
There are a number of cases holding that the 
marriage of a minor child operates to terminate 
the support provisions of a divorce or similar 
decree. Crook vs. Crook, 80 Ariz. 275, 296 P. 
2d 951, 58 ALR 2d 352 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1956) See 
-14-
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also annotation at 58 ALR 2d 355. 
It is the law in Utah that "insofar as a 
judgment is void, it does not affect title to 
property, confers no rights upon one obtaining 
it, and creates no liabilities upon the one 
against whom it is enforced." Utah law has it 
that a judgment may be collaterally attacked when 
it discloses on its face an order in excess of 
jurisdiction. An award exceeds the jurisdiction 
of the Utah courts to the extent that it decrees 
transfer or property or money to the children 
when they reach adulthood. Farley vs. Farley 19 
Utah 2d 301, 431 P. 2d 133 (1967) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Bernice Lewis is entitled to the 
proceeds of life insurance as a matter of 
contract between the insured, her former husband, 
and the Travelers Insurance Company. The claim 
of the adult children of the deceased, being 
based solely on term of divorce decree void on 
its face for lack of jurisdiction, have no cause 
-15-
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of action against any of the parties hereto, and 
their claim should be dismissed. 
Appellant respectfully states that the 
foregoing authorities establish her right to 
judgment as a matter of law, and urges this Court 
to reverse the judgment of the lower court, for 
her costs, and for such other appropriate relief 
as the Court may determine. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John D. Russell, 
Glen S. Hatch, 
252 Canyon Road, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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